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President Obama has trumpeted transparency as a major part of his reform
agenda, promising an “unprecedented” degree of governmental openness and
overseeing a variety of open government reforms, from changes in Freedom of
Information Act policies to the creation of new websites like Recovery.Gov. Although
transparency is politically popular, and the Obama Administration benefits in the short
run by contrasting itself with the Bush Administration’s reputation for secrecy, in the
long run President Obama’s rhetoric on openness in government may backfire
politically. Too much emphasis on making government a fishbowl will only raise
expectations about an unattainable or undesirable level of openness. Transparency has
clear benefits but it also has its costs, as when, for example, the prospect of disclosure
dampens internal deliberation and self-criticism by government officials. The real
choice for government, then, is how much transparency, and what type, to offer over
different processes. The Obama Administration has already found itself needing to
make tradeoffs and place limits on transparency, and it is likely to continue to do so in
the years to come. Yet members of the public, and certainly open-government activists,
are unlikely to appreciate the need for making such tradeoffs, generating
disappointment among the administration’s supporters and charges of hypocrisy by its
opponents. It remains unclear whether Barack Obama will ultimately earn the mantle
of the “transparency president” – or whether the unrealistic hopes for openness in
government he has raised will, when unfulfilled, only serve to reinforce public cynicism
about government.
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The Obama Administration and Open Government
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President George W. Bush left his successor more than just two major military
engagements and a massive economic crisis. He also left behind a wake of public
cynicism and concern about the legitimacy of the federal government in the United
States. To many observers, the Bush Administration operated too much in the dark,
begetting a general mistrust of the administration’s motives and actions. This mistrust
extended beyond the administration’s handling of its unpopular military and foreign
affairs, a domain where a high level of secrecy is certainly customary, if not expected.
Complaints about the Bush Administration’s secrecy also arose in the sphere of
domestic policy, from the beginning of Bush’s first term through his entire eight years
in office.
During his presidential campaign, Barack Obama pledged to reverse the course
taken by his predecessor along many fronts, including the Bush Administration’s
posture toward openness in government. Candidate Obama promised to “create a
transparent and connected democracy” (Obama 2007). After being sworn in, one of
President Obama’s first actions was to sign a memorandum committing his
administration “to creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government”
(Obama 2009a). His administration took numerous steps in its first 100 days to signal a
renewed commitment to governmental transparency.
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The Obama Administration’s actions provide, even at this early juncture of the
new presidency, an excellent opportunity to consider more fully the role of
transparency in government – as well as its value as a central part of a governmental
reform strategy. At first blush, of course, it might seem as if there would really be little
to consider. The electoral repudiation of the Bush Administration’s policies, combined
with the nearly universal veneration of open government as a political ideal, would
make transparency seem the sweet elixir of contemporary governance. The Obama
Administration’s early rhetoric has only reinforced this widespread veneration of
transparency. Since some governmental transparency is good, it might surely seem that
greater transparency must always be better still. Yet despite nearly universal acclaim for
transparency – or perhaps especially because of it – the concept and its application
merits closer examination. Neither scholars nor practitioners know as much about
transparency and its effects than might be supposed from the sheer popularity of the
concept. What is needed is to know more about the benefits of transparency, as well as
its costs. After all, it is possible to have too much of a good thing.
The Bush-to-Obama transition reveals that the most important challenge for open
government is not secrecy versus transparency, but figuring out how much
transparency, and what type, to have over different aspects of the governmental
process. Good, open government is not the same as a reality television show that
broadcasts every move officials make and every conversation they have. On the
contrary, good government actually requires certain limits on this kind of fishbowl
transparency. Moreover, recognition of such limits holds implications for the political
2

strategy of open government reform. Reformers who trumpet transparency at nearly
every turn, or who suggest that transparency can cure all that ails public policy, raise
public expectations of a much too extreme openness. As meeting such high expectations
is neither realistic nor wise, raising these expectations poses political risks. The Obama
Administration’s trumpeting of open government may seem politically appealing in the
short term – after all, most Americans support transparency – but in the longer run the
new President’s rhetoric, and the prominence his administration gives to transparency,
risks creating disappointment that may only serve to deepen public cynicism.

Toward Transparency’s Triumph

To a large extent, the prevailing triumph of transparency in the United States
grows out of a rejection of both the administrative policies and rhetorical tone of the
Bush administration, “one of the most secretive, closed administrations in American
history,” according to candidate Obama (Obama 2007). The Bush Administration’s
reputation for secrecy derived in part from its posture over international and homeland
security issues. But even before the Bush Administration launched its “global war on
terrorism,” it staked out a clear position favoring secrecy in certain aspects of domestic
policymaking as well. Shortly after assuming office in 2001, for example, President Bush
established an energy policy task force, chaired by Vice President Cheney, that met
secretly with representatives from the energy industry, raising suspicions of undue
influence and even possible violations of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. When
3

outside environmental and watchdog groups requested materials from the task force,
the White House refused to release the information, prompting the outside groups to
file litigation seeking disclosure.
The Bush Administration ultimately prevailed in its position that the White
House could keep secret the meetings and deliberations of its energy task force (In re:
Richard B. Cheney 2005), but politically, the die had been cast. Throughout its eight
years, the Bush Administration sought to expand the power of the Presidency in ways
that raised widespread anxieties about an unfettered, unitary executive. These anxieties
increased each time the administration sought to keep documents from Congress or the
public.
Not long after September 11, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a
memo encouraging executive branch agencies to think carefully before releasing
information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and offering assurance that
the Department of Justice (DOJ) would be inclined to defend agency decisions to
withhold documents (Ashcroft 2001). In subsequent years, reports emerged that the
White House dictated which agency scientists could speak to the media about climate
change, that political appointees from the White House edited agency science reports,
and that on at least one occasion the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
administrator changed his mind over an important regulatory decision due to White
House pressure (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 2007; Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform 2008). As these controversies came to light, the
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Bush White House steadfastly resisted Congressional calls to turn over documents
detailing its communications with agency officials.
In fairness, it should be noted that some of the positions on executive authority
taken by the Bush Administration had been adopted by previous administrations
(Calabresi & Yoo 2008). President William Clinton, for example, took much the same
legal position over the release of information about his health care reform task force that
the Bush Administration took over its energy policy task force. Moreover, in other
ways, the Bush Administration actually took greater strides toward transparency than
did previous administrations, such as by making information available online about
meetings held between outside groups and the administrator of the White House Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) (Graham 2008). The Bush Administration
also invested significant resources and management effort in creating the Internet portal
Regulations.Gov, and then in taking steps to use that portal to make available all federal
agencies’ supporting materials for their new rulemaking proceedings (Coglianese 2007).
Despite efforts such as these, the Bush Administration was widely perceived as
having placed a cloak of secrecy over significant aspects of the federal government’s
operations. Many observers undoubtedly agreed with law professor David Vladeck,
who opined that “George W. Bush will go down in the annals of history as ‘The Secrecy
President’” (Committee on Government Reform Minority Staff 2004).
As a result, toward the end of the Bush Administration it became plain that the
next administration – whether Republican or Democratic – would have an opportunity
to chart a new course on governmental openness. The major candidates in the
5

presidential primary season made transparency and other “good government” issues
part of their campaign themes. Professional groups and advocacy organizations also
initiated processes to develop transparency-related recommendations for the new
administration. These transition projects helped lay a foundation for much of the
Obama Administration’s open government agenda.
One such project was launched in 2007 by a Washington, D.C.-based
transparency advocacy organization called OMB Watch. OMB Watch commissioned an
independent task force to focus on transparency and public participation issues in the
rulemaking process, and in July 2008 the task force issued a set of twenty-six
nonpartisan recommendations.1 Among other things, the task force recommended
streamlining the processing of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests,
encouraging agencies to release agency records proactively using online document
repositories, and improving the quality of the federal e-rulemaking portal,
Regulations.Gov (Coglianese, Kilmartin & Mendelson 2009).
Also in 2007, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Section on Administrative
Law and the Regulatory Process convened an ad hoc Committee on the Status and
Future of Federal e-Rulemaking, chaired by Sally Katzen, President Clinton’s OIRA
administrator (see ABA 2008).2 This committee focused on the progress the Bush
Administration had made in developing Regulations.Gov. In an October 2008 report,
the committee diagnosed the flaws in Regulations.Gov and offered recommendations
that called for a “fundamentally new approach” to both the internal management of the
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federal government’s rulemaking data system and public access to that system
(Committee on the Status and Future of Federal e-Rulemaking 2008).
Once President Obama won the election in November 2008, still other
transparency-related reports and recommendations appeared (Association of Health
Care Journalists 2008; Center for Progressive Reform 2008; Liberty and Security
Transition Coalition 2009; National Security Archive 2008; OMB Watch 2008a; OMB
Watch 2008b; Project on Government Oversight 2008; Sunlight Foundation 2008;
Sunshine in Government Initiative 2008). Most of these reports criticized the Ashcroft
memo and urged the Obama Administration to take more affirmative responses to
FOIA requests, as well as to improve public access by better use of information
technology. The sheer number of transparency-related transition reports from diverse
organizations lent support to the claim that “government openness is neither a left nor a
right issue. It is an American issue” (OMB Watch 2008b).

Transparency’s Triumph

As a candidate, Obama had clearly signaled his support of open government
reforms. He spoke out against dangers of special interests and called for an expansion
of public access to and participation in governmental decision-making. He decried the
Bush Administration’s use of “a legal tool known as the ‘state secrets’ privilege more
than any other previous administration to get cases thrown out of civil court” (Obama
2008). Obama promised that, if elected, he would take steps to “make White House
7

communications public” and to “conduct regulatory agency business in public”
(Obama 2008). He favored the “use [of] cutting-edge technologies to … creat[e] a new
level of transparency, accountability and participation for America’s citizens” (Obama
2007). In a pledge his campaign referred to as “Sunlight Before Signing,” he even
promised to make all “non-emergency bills” available on the White House website for
five days before signing them, so the public would have the opportunity to review and
comment on them (Obama 2008).
As much as Obama may have surprised the nation by appointing his chief
Democratic rival to be Secretary of State, it came as little surprise that transparency
became a dominant theme across his Administration’s agenda. On his very first full day
in office, President Obama signed three presidential memos, one announcing a pay
freeze for his senior aides and the other two dealing with open government. The first of
these two open government memos declared three abiding values he wanted his
Administration to follow: transparency, participation, and collaboration. This memo
also ordered the new Director of the Office and Management and Budget (OMB) to
issue an “Open Government Directive” specifying concrete steps to implement these
values across executive agencies and departments (Obama 2009a). In a potentially bold
assertion of executive authority, the memo also stated that “independent agencies
should comply with the Open Government Directive” (Obama 2009a).
Obama’s second transparency memo directed his Attorney General to develop a
new FOIA policy that would clearly establish a presumption in favor of the release of
government information. “In the face of doubt,” Obama declared, “openness prevails”
8

(Obama 2009b). Furthermore, he stated that “the Government should not keep
information confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by
disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or
abstract fears” (Obama 2009b). By operating under principles such as these, federal
agencies would be able to “usher in a new era of open Government” (Obama 2009b).
In addition to the two open government memos, President Obama issued two
open government executive orders on his first day. First, he revoked a Bush executive
order that enabled former presidents to limit public access to their official documents.
Under the procedures outlined in Obama’s new executive order, the National Archives
could more easily release these historical records over the objections of a former
president (Obama 2009c). Second, Obama issued an executive order imposing ethics
requirements on incoming officials and a lobbying ban on officials who leave the
administration. Unlike previous presidents who had imposed similar requirements only
on their most senior appointees, President Obama imposed his requirements on “every
appointee in every executive agency” (Obama 2009d).
A week later, President Obama instructed his OMB director to review a previous
executive order issued by President Clinton, and adhered to by President Bush,
governing White House review of new regulations. The President called for
recommendations for a possible revision of the regulatory review executive order,
including suggestions on “disclosure and transparency” (Obama 2009e). Notably, OMB
then solicited public comments to help inform its recommendations, a highly unusual, if
not unprecedented, step for the development of an executive order (see OMB 2009). By
9

the close of the comment period, OMB received over 150 submissions and subsequently
posted them on the OMB website. (The office has said that its staff members will read
the comments carefully -- although they do not intend to respond to them.)
During the first several weeks of the administration, Obama’s economic and
legislative teams were preoccupied with brokering a $787 billion economic stimulus
package – but transparency was nevertheless not forgotten. To monitor spending under
the stimulus bill, the legislation created a new Recovery Accountability and
Transparency Board. In a speech before a joint session of Congress in February,
President Obama announced the creation of a new website – Recovery.gov – intended
to ensure “that every American can find out how and where their money is being
spent” (Obama 2009f). In mid-March, he issued a presidential memorandum banning
conversations between government officials and lobbyists over economic stimulus
funds and requiring Internet-based disclosure of written communications (Obama
2009g).
Also in mid-March, Attorney General Eric Holder completed his review of FOIA
policy and rescinded the Ashcroft memo. Henceforth, the DOJ would only defend FOIA
denials when disclosure was prohibited by law or when an “agency reasonably foresees
that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the statutory exemptions”
from disclosure (Holder 2009). Consistent with recommendations in many of the
transition reports, Holder encouraged agencies to consider disclosing records even if
technically the records could fit under one of FOIA’s exemptions, and urged agencies to
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work “proactively and promptly” to “post information online in advance of any public
request” (Holder 2009).
A month later, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued its own
agency-specific transparency guidelines. The new EPA guidelines called for disclosure
“wherever possible under the FOIA” and “steps to make information public on the
Agency’s Web site without waiting for a request from the public to do so” (Jackson
2009). The EPA administrator also announced that her appointment calendar would be
posted daily on the agency’s website.
In addition to posting government documents and data online, the Obama
Administration took steps to use the Internet more interactively. For example, the
administration launched the creation of Healthreform.Gov, an interactive site that
includes web streaming of health care reform forums, blog postings by government
officials, and a comment function that allows the public to share stories and ideas about
health care. The President also held an interactive town hall via the Internet, at which he
answered questions submitted and voted on by members of the public. Individuals
reportedly submitted more than 100,000 questions in advance of the Town Hall, and the
online community cast over 3.5 million votes on these questions (Stolberg 2009).
Overall, the administration sought to encourage more of these kinds of online
innovations through what it has called the Open Government Initiative, a project that,
of course, has its own website and blog (Open Government Initiative 2009). The
Initiative has publicized new transparency and public participation efforts and solicited
public input about the development of additional ones, including using a wiki to allow
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the public to collaborate in the drafting of further transparency-related
recommendations.

The Virtues and Vices of Open Government

The Obama Administration’s enthusiastic embrace of transparency fits into a
pattern of both broad cultural interest in the Internet and societal support for
transparency. Poll data indicate that about 80% of Americans view making the federal
government more open and accountable to be an important priority (Lake Research
Partners/Topos Partnership 2009). With nearly everyone agreeing that government
should be more transparent, it may seem as if transparency has become viewed as an
unalloyed public good, even an end all of its own.
Yet is transparency really the ultimate end that government should strive to
serve? Rather than being valued for its own sake, transparency is actually a tool that can
advance the much more fundamental goals of good public policy and legitimate
governmental decision-making. Transparency can serve these larger ends in both
affirmative and preventative ways. First, transparency can affirmatively improve
governmental decision-making by helping inform the public about the problems
governmental officials seek to solve and the options they are considering. By making
more information available, the public can then participate more thoughtfully in the
governmental process, sharing new information or raising questions about the
adequacy of proposed governmental solutions (Stiglitz 2003). Such informed
12

participation by citizens, professional groups, interest organizations, and others can, in
turn, help inform governmental officials and enable them to make better decisions.
Second, transparency can help preventatively, making abuses and mistakes by
government officials less likely, as those officials know that ordinary citizens, organized
interest groups, the media, and other government officials (especially those specifically
charged with oversight roles) can more easily monitor the workings of the federal
government. When officials know that those outside government can see what they are
doing, they are presumably more likely to comply with norms of good governance
(Coglianese, Kilmartin & Mendelson 2009). They may be more careful, less susceptible
to expediency or improper influence, and more inclined to try to listen to all concerned.
Although transparency can act as a check on bad decision-making and help
improve good decision-making, this does not mean that greater transparency is always
better. Too much transparency – or transparency in the wrong places – might actually
detract from officials’ ability to make good decisions. One worry is that under an
extreme transparency achievable today with the aid of advanced technology, officials
will not engage in as probing and self-critical forms of deliberation because they know
that outsiders could be monitoring everything they say and do -- and perhaps will try to
use against them later what they say when simply “thinking aloud.” Although
transparency may help inhibit undesirable forms of behavior, total transparency is also
likely to inhibit other, desirable behavior – such as internal dissent or asking the
proverbial dumb question – that might be embarrassing but is still necessary for good
decision-making (Sunstein 2003).
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Total transparency could also make it less likely that government officials would
gain useful information from private actors (Coglianese, Zeckhauser & Parson 2004).
Certain kinds of trade secrets or other sensitive business information may be essential
for government officials to obtain and analyze in order to adopt effective policies
regulating industry. Clearly, businesses would be even more reluctant to share such
information with government if they knew it would not only help regulators but also
need to be disclosed to competitors and to the public.
Recognizing that some circumstances or types of information call for
confidentiality and secrecy, even officials in the Obama Administration accept that “the
disclosure obligation … is not absolute” (Holder 2009). The question is not transparency
or secrecy, but how much transparency to foster -- and about what types of information
to disclose. FOIA itself exempts from disclosure documents involving national security
issues, personnel matters, or trade secrets. Attorney General Holder’s memo on FOIA
indicates that the DOJ will defend agency decisions to withhold records not merely
when they fall under these exemptions in the law, but also when releasing the records
simply “would harm an interest protected by one of the statutory exemptions” (Holder
2009, emphasis added). Despite President Obama’s seemingly absolutist rhetoric about
a “new era of open government,” he surely realizes that governing well requires
making tradeoffs.
Less clearly acknowledged, though, is the question of exactly what kind of
transparency to promote. The Obama Administration, as well as most of the organized
groups and tech-savvy individuals that advocate open government, have emphasized
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what could be called fishbowl transparency. The aim is to expand the release of
information that can document how government officials actually behave, such as by
disclosing meetings held between White House staff and outside groups. But there is
another type of transparency, reasoned transparency, that demands that government
officials offer explicit explanations for their actions. Sound explanations will be based
on application of normative principles to the facts and evidence accumulated by
decision-makers – and will show why other alternative courses of action were rejected.
Sound policy explanations are not the same as the kind of account that journalists or
social scientists would give if they were trying to explain, as an empirical matter, why a
policy was in fact adopted, an account that would clearly be aided by an expansion of
fishbowl transparency. Instead, reasoned transparency depends on making a
substantive evaluation of the soundness of an official’s reasoning, not on knowing
whether that official might have met with one interest group or another.
This distinction in types of transparency is important because whenever limits
need to be placed on fishbowl transparency, whether to preserve space for robust
deliberation or to advance other values such as national security or personal privacy,
reasoned transparency can still discipline governmental decision-making – serving the
same goals as fishbowl transparency -- if officials know they must provide sound
reasons for their decisions. Unfortunately, the current fascination with the Internet
appears to make it easy to lose sight of the value of reasoned transparency. The U.S.
governmental process may well benefit even more from an improvement in reasoned
transparency than from the vast expansion of fishbowl transparency that modern
15

technology would now permit. Modern information technology may give us more
noise, when what we really need is better music.
Developing open government policies is more complex than any bumper-sticker
rhetoric would imply. Greater transparency – of the fishbowl variety – is not always
better. In developing federal open government rules, decision-makers need to balance
both the advantages and disadvantages of expanded transparency, and to consider
which type of transparency (if any) ought to be expanded. Addressing these issues
demands a better understanding than we currently have of how different types of, and
different levels of, transparency affect governmental behavior, policy outcomes, and
public perceptions of legitimacy.
Despite politicians and the public’s fervor for transparency, social scientists have
had much too little to say about how government officials and the public respond under
different levels and types of transparency. Will greater transparency, of one kind or
another, deliver more benefits than costs? This is a hard question for empirical research
to address for several reasons. For one, the variable we care most about understanding
– transparency -- is hard to measure. What exactly does a unit of transparency look like?
In addition, the outcomes that transparency presumably affects – decisional quality and
legitimacy -- are also exceedingly difficult to measure, and many factors other than
transparency come into play in affecting these outcomes.
Despite these difficulties, designers of open government standards – that is,
legislators, agency administrators, and government lawyers -- surely could demand
more of the research community instead of simply relying on the assumption that
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greater transparency is always better. It may turn out to be the case, for example, that
there are diminishing marginal returns to transparency. That is to say, when a highly
secretive government makes a shift from virtually no transparency to even a modest level
of transparency, the behavioral effects in terms of good governance may be much more
dramatic than when an already quite open government shifts to a still higher level of
transparency.
The possibility of diminishing returns is worth contemplating because, at least
compared to other countries, the federal government in the United States already has
quite an open public policy process -- both in terms of fishbowl and reasoned
transparency. Statutes such as the FOIA, Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and
Government in Sunshine Act have long compelled government offices to make
information available to the public and to give the public opportunities to comment on
proposed policies. Even during the Bush years, the administration’s critics learned
much about governmental actions, not only from document “leaks” by sympathetic
insiders (Roberts 2008) but also from filing FOIA requests (Kreimer 2007; Kreimer 2008).
In addition to laws like FOIA which enhance fishbowl transparency, long-established
practices of legislative and judicial oversight have reinforced reasoned transparency.
When cabinet secretaries and agency administrators must testify before a congressional
committee or respond to lawsuits filed under the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious”
standard, they must provide and defend their reasons.
Even against the existing baseline, of course, the U.S. system can always be made
more transparent. Governmental reasoning could often be much stronger, and the
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fishbowl could be more translucent. But it will always be possible to say things could be
more transparent in the fishbowl sense, at least until cameras and microphones are
placed in every government office, or chips loaded in the brains of bureaucrats, with the
digital data instantly uploaded to the Internet. Although greater visibility may always
be possible, it may not always be needed or justified. Additional incremental increases
in transparency should occur only when they will have, on balance, a positive effect on
the quality or legitimacy of government decisions.

The Political Economy of Transparency

Whatever the underlying virtues and vices of enhancing still further the
transparency of the U.S. federal government, it is not hard to see why, as a matter of
political strategy, President Obama would want to make open government such a major
theme at the start of his administration. For one thing, he presumably genuinely
believes that the federal government should be more transparent. But the political
economy of transparency also makes it easier for him to act on this conviction.
Advocating transparency not only distances his administration from his unpopular
predecessor’s, but transparency sells well. Everyone seems to favor it, whether on the
political left or the right. The beneficiaries of enhanced transparency are well-organized
groups of all stripes; businesses favor transparency as much as public interest groups
do. Any potential losers from a new presumption of openness are generally unknown
and unorganized – since they lose only when specific information is disclosed at some
18

point in the future. Furthermore, making government information more readily
available to the public requires little in the way of additional budgetary resources, and
the President can announce and act on his commitment to transparency without
needing congressional approval (though he would likely receive it anyway). In the
short-term, then, it seems clear that President Obama had little reason politically not to
declare he would usher in a “new era of open government.”
In the medium to long term, though, the political calculus does not work out so
clearly in Obama’s strategic favor. Having emphasized transparency at nearly every
turn, the President has now raised public expectations that are likely to be difficult to
meet over the duration of his administration. Every time he or his cabinet resists the
disclosure of government records, he risks disappointing the left and making himself
vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy by the right.
In just his first few months in office, President Obama has already had to make
decisions that compromise complete transparency -- and afterwards he has consistently
found himself subject to criticism. For example, despite candidate Obama’s statements
opposing the Bush Administration’s use of the “state secrets” privilege, DOJ attorneys
serving under President Obama have continued (sometimes unsuccessfully) to invoke
this privilege in litigation (Binyam v. Dataplan 2009). According to one commentator,
the Obama DOJ’s position on the state secrets privilege “is equal to, and in some senses
surpasses, the radical secrecy and immunity claims of the Bush administration”
(Greenwald 2009).
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Criticisms have also been leveled at the Obama Administration when it has
denied FOIA requests, however legal and appropriate such denials may have been. The
most salient such case involved a request by the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) for the release of photos documenting military personnel’s treatment of
detainees. After initially indicating he would support the release of these photos,
President Obama reversed course and decided to deny the ACLU’s FOIA request,
stating that the photos’ release would endanger American troops. As one of many news
accounts reported, “civil liberties and human rights advocates said the [President’s]
reversal would serve to maintain the Bush administration's legacy of secrecy” (Wilson
2009). The ACLU attorney seeking the photos declared, not surprisingly, that “this
essentially renders meaningless President Obama's pledge of transparency and
accountability that he made in the early days after taking office” (Wilson 2009).
Similar concerns about Obama’s ability to deliver on his promises have surfaced
in connection with the Recovery.Gov website, which the president declared would
enable the public to track the spending of federal dollars appropriated by the economic
stimulus legislation. The Washington Post has reported that “three months after the bill
was signed, Recovery.gov offers little beyond news releases, general breakdowns of
spending, and acronym-laden spreadsheets and timelines. And congressional
Democrats, state officials and advocates of open government worry that the White
House cannot come close to clearing the high bar it set” (MacGillis 2009).
Candidate Obama’s “Sunlight Before Signing” pledge may have set yet another
unrealistically high bar, as it has been a regular source of fodder for the president’s
20

critics. Only about one out of the first dozen pieces of legislation signed by the president
had been posted on the White House website for the promised five-day period of public
comment (Harper 2009). With each piece of legislation’s approval in the absence of the
public comment period, the President has provided an opportunity for critics and the
media to remind the public about his (unmet) campaign pledge (Henry 2009).

Conclusion

As a matter of political strategy, then, transparency is a double-edged sword.
During the transition from the Bush Administration, it may well have looked like
trumpeting the cause of open government would be an easy way for any new president
to score political points, especially when taking over from a reviled predecessor with a
reputation for secrecy. But President Obama’s rhetoric and zeal for transparency has
also created false impressions – and unrealistic expectations -- about what it takes to
make open government work well. Just as good governance requires making judgment
calls and difficult tradeoffs about other policy criteria, good open governance requires
the same about transparency.
To be sure, the Obama Administration is already making transparency tradeoffs.
Rhetorical speeches and new websites notwithstanding, this administration appears no
less prone than previous ones to protecting the opacity of internal government
deliberations and to placing limits on information disclosure when officials believe
doing so would serve important policy objectives. But this reality only underscores the
21

political risk of giving transparency such prominence on a new president’s reform
agenda. Members of the general public, and certainly of the open government activist
community, may not appreciate the full complexities of governing nor be willing to
support anything less than full disclosure. Given the political risks created by
heightened expectations, it remains to be seen whether Barack Obama will end his time
in office having secured a reputation as the “transparency president” – or whether
Americans’ recently raised hopes for renewed openness in government will only turn
back to renewed cynicism about government.
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